

GRANTS'S

INTEREST RATE OBSERVER®

Vol. 33, No. 09a

Two Wall Street, New York, New York 10005 • www.grantspub.com

MAY 1, 2015

Revenge of the reciprocal

Finance is nothing if not symmetrical. There are assets, and there are liabilities. There is demand, and there is supply. For every policy yin, there is a policy yang. The unscripted consequences of post-2007 monetary intervention is the subject at hand.

We conclude, skipping right down to the bottom line, that radical policy is here to stay. We so judge because the Fed's newfound M.O.—ostensibly a bulwark against financial instability—is itself inherently destabilizing. Look no further than the life insurance business, the oil market or the pricing of “high-yield” debt. One episode of QE tends to set up a clamor for another, and then another. Besides, the mandarins demand, what's the harm? Where's the inflation?

A crack-up, say, in the European life insurance industry (brought about by Mario Draghi's vanishing interest rates) or a bankruptcy-inducing plunge in some oversupplied commodity market (instigated by producer access to ultra-cheap finance), would surely spark new rounds of aggressive central bank action. It would make no difference that the not-so-remote cause of the trouble was monetary policy itself. The Fed's functional dual mandate has become that of arsonist and fireman.

The central bank, though it is well aware of the existence of financial liabilities, never seems to mention them. Asset inflation is what the banks of Bernanke and Yellen set out to achieve. Unavoidably, they also achieved liability inflation, its reciprocal.

Like assets, liabilities have values, even if we customarily think of those values as burdens. The lower the discount rate, the greater the liability. The

greater the liability, the more collateral it takes to satisfy the contractual commitment to pay savers, annuitants and pensioners, observes Sean McShea, president of Ryan Labs Asset Management. A simple example will illustrate. At a 6% yield, \$1 million in principal will earn you \$60,000 a year. At a 3% yield, you'll need \$2 million to provide the same income. “The rising cost of retirement” is another way of saying “the rising value of liabilities.”

The bull market in liabilities is the source of the bear market in life insurance. “Germany's life assurers: the next crisis?” was the headline over the April 21 *Financial Times* report on the gathering clouds over *Lebensversicherungsgesellschaften*, as a thrifty burgher would call the indigenous life business. Some 90 German life insurance companies with €900 billion of assets under management are panting for the interest rates that Mario Draghi's Europe does not provide. (On Tuesday, Bloomberg flashed news that an issue of securitized Spanish business loans had stopped paying interest because Euribor, the euro-denominated three-month interbank offered rate, had dropped below zero to minus 0.005%.)

“[G]uaranteed rates far outstrip today's meager investment returns,” the *FT* reports of the German life companies. “Although new policy guarantees are capped by law at 1.25%, the long tail of policies—which typically extend for 30 years—means average guarantees are still running at 3.2%. Compare that with the 0.14% yield on 10-year bunds, and the tension becomes obvious.”

The tension is pan-European. According to the IMF's new report on financial

stability, or rather the lack of it, “more than half of European life insurers are guaranteeing an investment return to policyholders that exceeds the yield on the local 10-year government bond, thereby incurring undesirable negative investment spreads.”

Which points to a “high and rising risk of distress” among mid-size companies, the IMF analysis continues. The failure of one could trigger a loss of confidence among many, “if the failure is believed to reflect a generalized problem. . . . The high and rising interconnectedness of the insurance industry and the wider EU financial system is another source of potential spillovers. The industry has a portfolio of €4.4 trillion in EU credit. Furthermore, insurers are traditionally closely linked to banks through liquidity swaps and bank bond holdings. . . . A large mark-to-market shock could force life insurers into asset reallocations and sales that could engulf the financial system.” No surprise, then, that income-seekers have pushed half of euro-denominated BB-rated bonds—the highest rank of speculative grade, but still junk—to yields of less than 2%, according to the April 13 edition of the *Financial Times*.

The bull market in liabilities is raging on both sides of the Atlantic. In 2014, the defined benefit pension plans of the 100 biggest American corporations lost actuarial ground despite an average 9.2% gain in their average assets, according to the annual tally by *Pensions & Investments*. Liabilities gained more value than assets did, owing to a drop in the assumed average discount rate to 4.05% from 4.82% in 2013. People are living longer, too, but—as a matter of causation in the liabilities world—QE easily

trumps the revised mortality tables.

Radically easy money was supposed to expand aggregate demand by making the holders of assets feel richer. So stimulated, this vanguard of consumption would ostensibly spend until the economy achieved “escape velocity.”

If theory said one thing, practice has revealed another. It’s a world—to quote page one of Saturday’s *Wall Street Journal*—“awash in too much of almost everything.” Here was another kind of stimulus, no less effective because the central bankers didn’t plan for it.

Oil, cotton, iron ore, labor and capital are all in surplus, the *Journal* reports, “a glut that presents several challenges as policy makers struggle to stoke demand.” Like traffic and weather, or love and marriage, demand and supply are nearly inseparable. In trying to boost demand, the central bankers have inadvertently fired up production. Energy is Exhibit A.

Over the past decade, observes the new edition of Deutsche Bank’s annual study of junk bond defaults, energy was the fastest-growing segment, both of America’s economy and America’s capital markets. “Energy issuers,” according to the DB analysts, “now represent the single largest sector in the U.S. high-yield market, the second largest in U.S. investment-grade (after financials) and the third largest in U.S. equities.” Without money both cheap and abundant, it is hard to imagine the shale revolution taking the shape it did—nor the price of oil taking the kind of pratfall it has.

Now, a low oil price may be a gift to humanity. A collapsing oil price in the context of a leveraged oil industry is another matter. So, too, is a collapsing oil price in the context of an *idée fixe* that “deflation” is a peril that must

be met with aggressive reflationary action. Said action can’t help but distort some of the prices that the mandarins didn’t think to include in their macroeconomic modeling. More distortion, and greater instability lead to more intervention, i.e., to still more distortion and instability.

“The current state of plenty is confounding on many fronts,” the *Journal* story continues. “The surfeit of commodities depresses prices and stokes concerns of deflation. Global wealth—estimated by Credit Suisse at around \$263 trillion, more than double the \$117 trillion in 2000—represents a vast supply of savings and capital, helping to hold down interest rates, undermining the power of monetary policy.”

We wonder how much of this bruted cornucopia is “capital” and how much is debt. Capital is savings, or consumption deferred; you don’t have to pay it back. Credit is like a library book; you must return it by the due date. As to the “power of monetary policy,” we judge that it’s just as potent as ever. The rub is the results it achieves. They’re not always the ones the policy makers intended.

If the makers of QE meant to seed a bull market in junk bonds, they’ve outdone themselves. Jim Reid, Deutsche Bank’s high-yield strategist, relates that so far as the 2010-14 cohort of high-yield debt is concerned, defaults are the lowest since the start of modern record-keeping in 1983. Practically (this is *Grant’s* talking now), companies aren’t defaulting because the market, priced as it is, won’t let them, though the market may soon have to reconsider. At \$50 per barrel oil or less, the DB analysts reckon, each and every high-yield oil and gas issuer rated single-B and below will register negative free cash flow.

The paucity of defaults is, to our mind, no badge of honor but another proof of policy gone wrong. In the capitalist forest, old growth must perish to let the new growth find the sunlight (without which the denizens of the forest soon find themselves speaking Japanese). Besides, businesses that survive solely by the indulgence of their creditors aren’t destined to prosper once easy money becomes hard to get.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has published a new paper which takes the view that the Fed ought not to abandon QE but keep it handy for the next cycle of distress. “The author’s view,” concludes author Michelle L. Barnes, a Johns Hopkins Ph.D. and senior economist in the bank’s research department, “is that balance sheet tools in practice have led to benefits not available from using the federal funds rate tool alone, particularly because none of the feared costs from using these newer tools have yet materialized.” Be patient, we would counsel in this context; “feared costs” can take their own sweet time to materialize (as Paul Singer was quoted as saying in these pages two weeks ago).

“To add value to society,” Barnes proceeds, “the best action that the Fed can undertake is to do what is needed to execute appropriate policy, however that end is reached. Foregoing the use of potentially valuable policy tools because such tools are unconventional and the full cost and benefits as yet unknown seems to miss the point entirely. . . .”

Radical improvisation works, the economists cry. Let us therefore have more of it. And there will be more—on this, at least, *Grant’s* and the Ph.D.s see eye to eye.

●

*Grant’s® and Grant’s Interest Rate Observer® are registered trademarks of Grant’s Financial Publishing, Inc.
PLEASE do not post this on any website, forward it to anyone else, or make copies (print or electronic) for anyone else.
Copyright ©2015 Grant’s Financial Publishing Inc. All rights reserved.*

Vacation delectation

To the readers, and potential readers, of *Grant's*:

This anthology of recent articles, our summertime e-issue, is for you. Please pass it along, with our compliments, to any and all prospective members of the greater *Grant's* family.

Not yet a subscriber? Make yourself the gift of a year's worth of *Grant's* and get two issues added on to your subscription. That's a \$230 value.

We resume regular publication with the issue dated Sept. 4 (don't miss it!).

Sincerely yours,


James Grant, Editor
August 19, 2015



Subscribe today and save! Fax or mail the form below, go to www.grantspub.com/sb2015 or call 212-809-7994.

Yes, I want to subscribe.

Enclosed is my payment (either check or credit card).
(I understand I may cancel at any time for a prorated refund on the remainder of my subscription.)

Order by the deadline and we will add two free issues—**an additional \$230 value**—onto the end of your subscription.

- 1 year (24 issues) 26 ISSUES for \$1,175 U.S./\$1,215 Foreign
- 2 years (48 issues) 50 ISSUES for \$2,125 U.S./\$2,165 Foreign
- Check enclosed*

*Payment to be made in U.S. funds drawn upon a U.S. bank made out to Grant's.

_____ Exp. _____
Credit card number

Signature _____

CV number _____ (3-digit code on back of VISA/MC/Discover;
4-digit code on front of AMEX)

Offer good until December 15, 2015
Order online: Offer code:SB2015

Questions? Call 212-809-7994.
Fax your order: 212-809-8492

Name _____

Company _____

Address _____

Daytime Phone _____

E-mail _____